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Abstract 
The objective of this article is to develop a policy of indirect taxation on output factors that 
reconciles losses in case of a waiver of the direct tax in Cameroon. This initiative would help in 
solving the “Anglophone crisis” in Cameroon by addressing the half of the total tax collected that 
amounts at CFAF 2429.15 billion to their victims. A static computable general equilibrium model 
has enabled us to determine the equivalent rate applicable to the labor factor that would make it 
possible to compensate for losses if the government shifts away from taxation of household 
income. This rate is 34.569% for an income tax rate of 20%. It also enables boosting growth with 
an impact on GDP of 7.8%. Besides, each household group that receipts all the other half of tax 
collected from an indirect tax rate of 10% earns on well-being whereas in case of an equal sharing 
only the poor households benefit from it.   
Keywords:  taxation, prices, factors, crisis, computable general equilibrium 
JEL classification: C68 ; E62 ; H30 ; H53 
1. Introduction 
Since 2013, Cameroon is facing an unprecedented security crisis. This began with the Boko 
Haram group in the northern part of the country where the defense and bravery of the armed 
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forces have maintained control over this part of the country. Since October 2016, there have been 
the corporatist demands of Anglophone lawyers and teachers on the bipolarity of the texts that 
should have French and English versions. These unresolved claims served as a voice for the 
emergence of secessionist movements that brought trouble to the national public order. They 
claim the split of the country giving rise to the birth of a state called Ambazonia. The 
consequences, are quite disastrous. First on the humanitarian front, International Crisis Group 
(2018) indicates that, this crisis has caused more than 1850 deaths, 53000 internally displaced 
persons and 35000 refugees in Nigeria after 30 months of existence. Economically, it has caused 
losses of 6434 formal jobs and more than 8000 informal jobs for a shortfall of around CFAF 300 
billion according to GICAM (2018), given that the two Anglophone regions, particularly the 
North-West and South-west represent abound a fifth of the national wealth. These losses 
exclusively related to the Anglophone regions are certainly not without ripple effect on the other 
regions of the country. For example, the difficulties faced by North-West’ wood marketing 
operators in the border west region of the country. The shortage created in addition to causing 
inflation creates bottlenecks in the local wood processing industries. With this situation, a number 
of actions have been taken by the government to ease the tensions and frustrations among which: 
the establishment of a humanitarian assistance plan for the victims of the crisis, the setting up of 
a demobilization commission for disarmament and social reintegration. But the tensions do not 
seem to subside. No doubt the call for inclusive national dialogue by national and international 
political actors is a solution, but the fact remains that other palliative measures must continue to 
be considered which measures could continue after the crisis. 
It is in this context that we situate our study centered on fiscal policy. The upstream of these 
investigations is to put forth the problem of managing the security crisis in Cameroon.  
It is recognized that government revenue has a twofold nature: a part is derived from the indirect 
tax on production and on the factors of production (Cardenete et al. 2017) and the other part comes 
from the direct tax collected on households and firms’ income. In order to help ease the current 
social tensions throughout the country, we consider in this study the hypothesis of the collection 
of an additional tax on output and on labor factor with a half transferable to victims of the crisis 
3 
 
and the other transferable to all national households. As a result, the central question is whether 
such a decision could be effective. 
On the theoretical base, a slight intensification of all indirect taxes should reduce demand 
compensated in the same proportion for all goods as shown by Ramsey (1927). This fall in 
compensated demand is explained by the substitution effects that will emerge from household 
behavior. In this sense Sadka (1977) has established a necessary and sufficient condition to make 
this possible. It will be necessary that the compensated elasticities with respect to the wage rate 
of the different products are all equal. The theoretical model of Ramsey, however, will suffer 
from a major criticism that is to consider only one household. For example, Diamond (1975) in 
his model with several households showed that the reduction in compensated demand may not be 
proportional to the different household groups. This reduction should be lower if the consumption 
of the product concerned is concentrated between groups who firstly, have a high valuation of 
marginal income in terms of welfare and secondly, have a high probability to pay tax. 
A better analysis of tax reforms according to Ahmad and Stern (1991) will depend on the 
efficiency of revenue collection, its impact on the distribution of income, welfare and the 
motivation of the tax system in relation to economic activities.  For these objectives, economic 
theory plays a central role in the design of the tax structure. It indicates a simple model benchmark 
from which political implications can be inferred and provides a method for collecting and 
analyzing data. The focus of the analysis is to question how income can be generated through 
taxation but so as to continue over time and especially to boost the growth. 
On the empirical side, there is a great deal of investigation on the effects of the indirect tax on 
welfare (Almad and Stern 1991; Chan and Dung 2002; Toan 2005; Verde and Tol 2009; Dung 
2018). These are specific to address the issue using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model. Among these works, Dung (2018) examines the hypothesis of the effects of a 20% increase 
in VAT in Vietnam and concludes that government revenues increase by 4.9% against a decline 
in both income and Household consumption. But beyond all these conclusions, a strong 
observation relayed by Warren (2008) is that consumption taxes have a significant negative 
impact on the distribution of household disposable income regardless of the methodological 
approach adopted. This shows at the same time that very few works considered the question of 
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the indirect tax on factors of production which according to Cardenete et al. (2017) is equally an 
important instrument tax for the government. Moreover, the management of the security crisis 
like the problems facing Cameroon today seems to be completely ignored in these works. To 
carry out such a study seems to be very important on the socio-economic level, especially since 
this crisis is subject to unbearable costs for the government. 
This is why we propose in this article to provide a palliative solution based on the indirect tax on 
the labor factor which will not only help the citizens of the crisis zones, but also to ease the social 
tensions that are currently rife across the whole of the national territory. This indirect tax on labor 
would compensate for this loss if the government were to give up the collection of 20% of 
consumer income. Basically, we assume a 10% increase in the rate of the tax on production so 
that half of the resulting income is transferable to the victims of the crisis and the other 
transferable to all national households by distinguishing rich households from poor households. 
As a result, the central question is whether the adoption of such a decision could be effective. 
Thus, the following section 2 is devoted to the review of past works on the policy of indirect 
taxation, section 3 presents the methodological approach that will help to obtain the results 
presented in section 4. A conclusion ends our investigations in section 5. 
2. Literature review 
We first of all carry out a theoretical review on the effects of indirect taxation, then an empirical 
review of the related works that has addressed the issue of indirect taxation using a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model, a tool used in this work. 
2.1. Theoretical review of the indirect taxation  
Originally, the fundamental works that put forth the effects of an indirect tax upstream date back 
to Ramsey (1927) and Diamond (1975). The difference between these two works is that Ramsey 
(1927) considers in his model a single household while Diamond (1975) considers several ones 
which also allow him to question some of Ramseys’ results. The latter considers an economy of 
consumption in which the consumer can divide his total budget between leisure and the purchase 
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of a certain number of goods. It studies the effectiveness of commodity taxation by assuming that 
the income tax is zero. With this in mind, he realizes that a slight intensification of all indirect 
taxes should reduce the compensated demand in the same proportion for all goods. Substitution 
effects are associated with efficiency losses. Ahmad and Stern (1991) thought that this finding 
gives no clarification of the optimal tax structure that it will depend on the efficiency of revenue 
collection, its impact on income distribution on well-being, and the motivation of the tax system 
in relation to economic activities. Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for such a result to 
occur is that the compensated elasticities with respect to the wage rates of different products are 
all equal. It also means that a reduction in the wage rate following a proportional increase in the 
income tax will reduce the claims compensated in the same proportion. 
However, Diamond (1975) demonstrates that these results can change if the behavior of several 
households is taken into consideration. He realizes that it is possible in such a case that the 
reduction in compensated demand is not proportional to the different household groups. This 
reduction should be lower if the consumption of the product concerned is concentrated between 
groups who firstly, have a high valuation of marginal income in terms of welfare and secondly, 
have a high probability to pay tax. He is followed by Deaton (1981) in his idea, who also shows 
that if we move to a multi-consumer economy and assume that the planner has preferences in 
favor of equity, the almost divisibility leads to a progressive tax structure. The low divisibility 
between commodities and leisure leads to a regressive indirect tax structure in the case of the 
single consumer. The introduction of an egalitarian planner and many savings in consumption 
will bring the solution to progressivity. Besley and Jewitt (1995) generalize this result by testing 
its applicability to a utility function. 
2.2. Review of Empirical Works on the Effects of Indirect Taxation: A CGE Approach 
Two papers published in the United Kingdom by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), namely 
Crawford et al. (2008) and Crossley et al. (2009), question the findings of other research and the 
widely accepted consensus that indirect taxes such as value added tax (VAT) are regressive. 
Crawford et al. (2008) postulate that an optimal consumption tax, levied at a rate unchanged over 
time, equates to a proportional tax on wages, transfers and income from profits. Crossley et al. 
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(2009), while partially admitting the negative effects of VAT on income, moderate their 
conclusion by stating that when the rich has more savings than the poor, this temporarily allows 
him to escape a high proportion of his income that could have been subject to VAT. This savings 
only incurs tax once it is subject to the expense. It is therefore important in such a situation that 
VAT does not necessarily affect the household income negatively. VAT should follow a 
progressive system to act in the first direction. 
In the framework of the CGE, the studies on the effects of the indirect tax are plethoric and involve 
the great majority the well-being of the households (Almad and Stern 1991; Chan and Dung 2002; 
Toan 2005; Verde and Tol 2009; Dung 2018). A consequent review of indirect taxation can be 
found in Warren (2008). The latter shows that beyond the methodological differences, all studies 
agree that consumption taxes have a significant negative impact on the distribution of household 
disposable income. Dung (2018), examining the hypothesis of the effects of a 20% increase in 
VAT in Vietnam, concludes that government revenues increase by 4.9% against a decline in both 
household income and consumption. Verde and Tol (2009) indicate that the lifestyles of low-
income people can exacerbate the regressivity of indirect taxation, particularly carbon taxes, as 
they are less energy-efficient and use fuels with higher carbon intensity. They also argue that the 
carbon tax is likely to be less regressive on consumption than on disposable income. Chan et al. 
(1999) in a tax reform study in Vietnam show that a sale tax reform positively contributes to the 
economy. It also has significant redistributive effects that tend to overwhelm the overall impact. 
Chan and Dung (2002) reach almost the same conclusions, with particular emphasis on the 
positive social well-being effects that such a reform might entail. Then, the tariffs should be 
eliminated beforehand. However, the elimination of tariffs leads to growing inequalities between 
rich and poor, but also between rural households and urban households. In the same vein, Chan 
et al. (2005) obtain similar results by orienting their study on the labor market. Toan (2005), on 
the other hand, finds a negative impact of the elimination of tariffs but with mixed results between 
the urban households that earn and the rural households that lose. 
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3. Methodology 
The methodological approach adopted in this article is inspired from the work of Cardenete et al. 
(2017). The latter in their model determine the tax rate on the labor factor compatible with a 
cancellation of the direct tax on the income of consumers. They make the following assumptions: 
• The economy includes two factors of production including labor and capital, two 
consumers, the government, two firms and two goods; 
• The factors are owned by two consumers who sell them to two firms and the income they 
derive from them is used to finance their consumption; 
• The value added of each firm, resulting from the transformation of the factors of 
production, is combined with the intermediate consumption to produce the final output; 
• Each firm produces only one good; 
• The production, consumption and value-added functions are of the Cobb Douglas type with 
constant returns to scale; 
• The government has three sources of revenue: the indirect tax on final output, the indirect 
tax on factors and the direct tax on the income of consumers; 
• All collected tax is transferred to consumers 
In this article, we make the following changes and additions: 
• The economy still has two households, but the first one is a rich household determined on 
the basis of national wealth at the official poverty rate1 and the second one is a poor 
household; 
• The government deploys 50% of the total additional tax collected to support the victims of 
the security crises of North West and South West and the remainder is transferred to 
households. 
 
1
 It is 37.5% in 2017 
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3.1. Variables and parameters of the model 
The ratings are those of Cardenete et al. (2017) to which we add variables and parameters that 
take into account the weight of transferable government income to households. For simplicity we 
summarize them below. 
N° Variables Description 
1 𝑃𝑖 Price of good 𝑖 
2 𝜔𝑘 Price of the factor of production 𝑘 
3 𝜔𝑛𝑘 Net price of the factor of production 𝑘 
4 𝑌𝑖 Total output of firm 𝑖 
5 𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑖 Value added price for firm 𝑖 
6 𝑏𝑘,𝑖 Technical coefficient for the use of the factor of production 𝑘 by firm 𝑖 
7 𝐶𝑖,ℎ Individual demand for the consumption of good 𝑖 by the household ℎ 
8 𝐶𝐷𝑖 Aggregate demand for final consumption of good 𝑖 
9 𝑋𝑘,𝑖 Demand for the factor of production 𝑘 by the firm 𝑖 
10 𝑋𝐷𝑘 Aggregate demand for the factor of production 𝑘 
11 𝑇𝐶 Total tax collected by the government 
12 𝑇𝐶𝑇 Tax collected and transferable to households 
13 𝑂𝑇 Tax collected on output 
14 𝐹𝑇 Tax collected on production factors  
15 𝑀𝑇 Tax collected on household income 
16 𝐺𝐷𝑃  GDP based on income approach at market price 
17 𝑖𝑌𝑖,𝑗  Intermediary consumption of good 𝑖 by the firm 𝑗 
18 𝑉𝐴𝑖 Value added of the firm's branch 𝑖 
19 𝑍 Variable for objective function 
    Parameters Description 
1 𝑒𝑘,ℎ Household endowment ℎ in the factor of production 𝑘 
2 𝛽𝑖,ℎ Elasticity of the demand for good 𝑖 by household ℎ 
3 𝑎𝑖,𝑗 Input-output matrix coefficient 
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4 𝛼𝑘,𝑖 Elasticity of demand for the production factor k by the firm 𝑖 
5 𝑣𝑖 Coefficient of value added in branch 𝑖 
6 𝜏𝑖 Government tax rate on product 𝑖 
7 𝑚ℎ Income tax rate on household ℎ 
8 𝛿ℎ Fraction of tax transferred to household ℎ in TCT 
9 𝑡𝑘 Rate of tax applied on factor 𝑘 
10 𝜗 Fraction of government income transferred to households 
With  𝐼 ⊆  {𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠}, 𝑘 ⊆  {𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙} ℎ ⊆  {𝑅𝑖𝑐ℎ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑, 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑}  
3.2. Equations 
The model is based on a system of simultaneous equations integrating four groups of variables 
(commodity prices 𝑃𝑖 , factor prices 𝜔𝑘, output levels 𝑌𝑖 and tax level T). 
Let's start from the basic equations formulated by Cardenete et al. (2017) for which the price of 
the value added 𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑖  is related to the price of factor 𝜔𝑘 by equation (1) and of the following 
price equation  𝑃𝑖 (2): 
 𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑖 = ∏ 𝜔𝑘𝛼𝑘,𝑖𝑘  (1) 
 𝑃𝑖 = (1 + 𝜏𝑖). (𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑖 . 𝑣𝑖 + ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑎𝑗,𝑖𝑗 ) (2) 
By replacing (1) in (2),  we obtain: 
 𝑃𝑖 = (1 + 𝜏𝑖). (∏ 𝜔𝑘𝛼𝑘,𝑖𝑘 . 𝑣𝑖 + ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑎𝑗,𝑖𝑗 ) (3) 
 
The relation (3) gives a system of 3 equations (because the set 𝑖  contains three elements 
agriculture, industry and services) and 5 unknown variables in particular (𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3, 𝜔1, 𝜔2). This 
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system can not therefore be solved independently except to fix two variables. To find the 
additional equations, Let’s start from the following equations2  (4), (5), (6), (7) respectively 
expressing the technical coefficients for labor and capital 𝑏𝑘,𝑖, the demand for factors 𝑋𝑘,𝑖, and 
aggregate demand 𝑋𝐷𝑘: 𝑏1𝑖 = 𝛼1𝑖 . (𝜔2𝜔1)𝛼2𝑖  (4) 𝑏2𝑖 = 𝛼2𝑖 . (𝜔1𝜔2)𝛼1𝑖 (5) 𝑋𝑘,𝑖 = 𝑏𝑘𝑖. 𝑣𝑖 . 𝑌𝑖 (6) 
 𝑋𝐷𝑘 = ∑ 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑖  (7) 
By substituting (4) and (5) in (6) then the resulting expression in (7) we obtain: 𝑋𝐷𝑘 = ∑ 𝑏𝑘𝑖. 𝑣𝑖 . 𝑌𝑖𝑖   (8) 
We thus obtain 𝑏𝑘𝑖 = 𝑏𝑘𝑖(𝜔𝑘),   𝑋𝐷𝑘 = 𝑋𝐷𝑘(𝜔𝑘, 𝑌𝑖) . Note also that 𝑋𝐷𝑘  does not represent 
anything else than the total endowment of the factor of production 𝑘 by the household ℎ that was 
denoted earlier as 𝑒𝑘,ℎ that is: 𝑋𝐷𝑘 = ∑ 𝑒𝑘,ℎℎ = ∑ 𝑏𝑘𝑖. 𝑣𝑖 . 𝑌𝑖𝑖  (9) 
The expression (9) gives us a system of 2 equations and 5 unknown variables too (𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝑌1, 𝑌2, 𝑌3)   which makes a total of 5 equations and 8 unknown variables  (𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3, 𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝑌1, 𝑌2, 𝑌3).  So, there are 3 equations missing to make the system square. 
Note to clarify the procedure to be followed for the determination of the latter equations that, 
because of the tax on the factor  𝑡𝑘, the net price of factor 𝜔𝑛𝑘 is related to its nominal price 𝜔𝑘 
by the relation: 
 
2
 The details of these equations can be found in Cadenete et al. (2017) chapter 4 
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𝜔𝑛𝑘 = 𝜔𝑘1 + 𝑡𝑘 (10) 
This net factor price makes it possible to elaborate equations  (11) ,  (12) , (13)  and (14) 
respectively representing the tax collected on the output, the tax on the factors, the tax on the 
income and the total tax: 
 𝑂𝑇 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖. 𝑌𝑖. (𝑃𝑣𝑎𝑖. 𝑣𝑖 + ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑎𝑗,𝑖𝑗 )𝑖  (11) 
 𝐹𝑇 = ∑ ∑ 𝑡𝑘.𝑘𝑖 𝜔𝑛𝑘. 𝑏𝑘,𝑖. 𝑣𝑖 . 𝑌𝑖 (12) 
 𝑀𝑇 = ∑ 𝑚ℎ. (𝛿ℎ. 𝑇𝐶 + ∑ 𝜔𝑛𝑘. 𝑒𝑘,ℎ𝑘 )ℎ  (13) 
 𝑇𝐶 = 𝑂𝑇 + 𝐹𝑇 + 𝑀𝑇 (14) 
Starting from equation (2), expression (11) can be simplified as follows: 
 𝑂𝑇 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖(1 + 𝜏𝑖)𝑖 . 𝑌𝑖. 𝑃𝑖 (15) 
By replacing equations (15), (12) and (13)3 in (14), we obtain: 
 𝑇𝐶 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖1 + 𝜏𝑖𝑖 . 𝑌𝑖. 𝑃𝑖 + ∑ ∑ 𝑡𝑘.𝑘𝑖 𝜔𝑘1 + 𝑡𝑘 . 𝑏𝑘,𝑖. 𝑣𝑖 . 𝑌𝑖+ ∑ 𝑚ℎ. (𝛿ℎ. 𝑇𝐶 + ∑ 𝜔𝑘1 + 𝑡𝑘 . 𝑒𝑘,ℎ𝑘 )ℎ  (16) 
By grouping we deduce 𝑇𝐶 as follows: 
 𝑇𝐶 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖1+𝜏𝑖𝑖 .𝑌𝑖.𝑃𝑖+∑ ∑ 𝑡𝑘.𝑘𝑖 𝜔𝑘1+𝑡𝑘.𝑏𝑘,𝑖.𝑣𝑖.𝑌𝑖+∑ 𝑚ℎ.(∑ 𝜔𝑘1+𝑡𝑘.𝑒𝑘,ℎ𝑘 )ℎ1−∑ 𝑚ℎ.𝛿ℎℎ   (17) 
 
3
 Equations (12)  et (13) have been reduced as a function of  𝘗, 𝜔, 𝑌 
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Equation (17) expresses the total tax collected and is therefore an equilibrium equation of the 
system with 9 variables  (𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3, 𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝑌1, 𝑌2  , 𝑌3, 𝑇) . Moreover, the behavior of the 
equilibrium output is given by: 𝑌𝑖 = 𝐶𝐷𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗 . 𝑌𝑗𝑗  (18) 
This equation indicates that the firm produces output 𝑖 not only to satisfy household consumption 
demand but also to meet the demand for intermediary consumption of the branches which is then 
determined by: 𝑖𝑌𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗 . 𝑌𝑗 (19) 𝐶𝐷𝑖 Being defined as the aggregated demand for individual consumption 𝐶𝑖,ℎ i.e.: 𝐶𝐷𝑖 = ∑ 𝐶𝑖,ℎℎ  (20) 
This demand for individual consumption results from a Marshallian maximization program of a 
Cobb Douglas utility function with constant returns to scale, so the resolution gives: 
𝐶𝑖,ℎ = (1 − 𝑚ℎ). 𝛽𝑖,ℎ. (𝛿ℎ. 𝑇𝐶 + (∑ 𝜔𝑘1 + 𝑡𝑘 . 𝑒𝑘,ℎ𝑘 ))𝑃𝑖  (21) 
Replacing (21)in (20) we obtain: 
 𝐶𝐷𝑖 = ∑ (1 − 𝑚ℎ). 𝛽𝑖,ℎ. (𝛿ℎ. 𝑇𝐶 + (∑ 𝜔𝑘1 + 𝑡𝑘 . 𝑒𝑘,ℎ𝑘 ))𝑃𝑖ℎ  (22) 
Thus, (22) in (18), gives: 
𝑌𝑖 = ∑ (1 − 𝑚ℎ). 𝛽𝑖,ℎ. (𝛿ℎ. 𝑇𝐶 + (∑ 𝜔𝑘1 + 𝑡𝑘 . 𝑒𝑘,ℎ𝑘 ))𝑃𝑖ℎ + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗 . 𝑌𝑗𝑗  (23) 
We thus obtain a new system of 3 equations with 9 variables. 
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This makes a total of 3 + 2 + 1 + 3 = 9 equations (given by systems (3), (9), (17) et (23)) 
respectively) and 9 variables. 
However, equality between the number of equations and the number of variables does not 
ensure the existence of an equilibrium solution  (𝑃∗, 𝜔∗, 𝑌∗, 𝑇∗). According to Walras' law, an 
equation of the equilibrium system is redundant. So, to solve it, a variable must be chosen as 
numéraire according to which all the other variables will be expressed. This allows for subsequent 
analysis of the results of the balance in relative value rather than in absolute value. 
In addition to the previous equilibrium system, we determine the amount of tax collected by 
the government and dedicated to be transferred to households (𝑇𝐶𝑇) by the following equation (24): 
 𝑇𝐶𝑇 = 𝑇𝐶. 𝜗 (24) 
And the 𝐺𝐷𝑃 is calculated according to income method as follows: 
 𝐺𝐷𝑃 = ∑ 𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝐶 − 𝑀𝑇 (25) 
With 
 𝑉𝐴𝑖 = ∑ 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑘  (26) 
Let’s now present the data for analysis 
3.3.  Social Accounting Matrix 
We are implementing Cameroon's Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 2016, based on data from 
the Table of Resources and Employment (TRE) from INS (2017) and from the national accounts. 
The TRE essentially allows building the input-output table for intermediary consumption. 
Information on factors of production is collected from the Ministry of Finance (MINFI) in 
collaboration with the INS. This SAM has 7 accounts, namely: 3 accounts for firms operating at 
the same time in the agriculture, industry and services; 2 accounts for production factors including 
labor and capital; 2 household accounts, one for the rich household and the other for the poor 
household.  
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For matrix balancing, three approaches are adopted for comparison: the cross-entropy method, 
the Ordinary Least Squares method and the similarity approach. The first two approaches in the 
literature offer the best estimates (Robinson et al. 1998; Robinson and El-Said 2000; Fall 2010; 
Lee and Su 2014; Cardenete et al. 2017) of the balanced social accounting matrix indicated in the 
appendix. 
3.4.  Calibration of the model 
The Calibration procedure consists of determining the initial values of the various parameters of 
the model from which the model will reproduce the benchmark equilibrium, that is to reproduce 
the data of the SAM before simulations are performed. Outside the parameters 𝜏𝑖, 𝑚ℎ, 𝛿ℎ, 𝑡ℎwhose 
values are fixed by the modeler, the scale and elasticity parameters must be calibrated. This is the 
place to recall that the values of the output levels are taken directly from the SAM. It is from these 
values that the calibration is carried out. 
Let’s start with the parameter 𝛽𝑖,ℎ representing the elasticity of consumer demand for good 𝑖 
by the household ℎ linked to a Cobb Douglas consumption function as follows: 𝑢ℎ(𝐶1ℎ, 𝐶2ℎ, … , 𝐶𝑁ℎ) = ∏ 𝐶𝑖,ℎ𝛽𝑖,ℎ𝑖  (27) 
In this economy, the consumer faces 𝑁 consumer goods and his budget constraint is given by: 
∑ 𝑃𝑖 . 𝐶𝑖,ℎ𝑖 = (1 − 𝑚ℎ). (∑ 𝜔𝑘. 𝑒𝑘,ℎ𝑘 + 𝛿ℎ. 𝑇𝐶𝑇) (28) 
The constraint (27) indicates by the right-hand side the consumer's income, which is essentially 
derived from the sale of the factors of production (the wage for the labor factor and the return of 
capital for the capital factor) but also from a government transfer of value 𝛿ℎ. 𝑇𝐶𝑇 since only the 𝑇𝐶𝑇 amount is allocated to the transfer to households. All this income supports at the same time 
a direct tax rate 𝑚ℎ. The net income of the household is then used to finance its consumption of 
goods whose cost is  𝑃𝑖 . 𝐶𝑖,ℎ monetary units. 
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𝜕𝑢ℎ(𝐶1ℎ, 𝐶2ℎ, … , 𝐶𝑁ℎ)𝜕𝐶1ℎ𝜕𝑢ℎ(𝐶1ℎ, 𝐶2ℎ, … , 𝐶𝑁ℎ)𝜕𝐶2ℎ = 𝑃1𝑃2 ⟺ 𝛽1,ℎ𝛽2,ℎ = 𝑃1. 𝐶1ℎ𝑃2. 𝐶2ℎ ⟺ 𝛽1,ℎ = 𝛽2,ℎ. 𝑃1. 𝐶1ℎ𝑃2. 𝐶2ℎ 
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale for two goods, we have 
 𝛽1,ℎ + 𝛽2,ℎ = 1 which leads to: 𝛽1,ℎ = 𝑃1. 𝐶1ℎ𝑃1. 𝐶1ℎ + 𝑃2. 𝐶2ℎ  𝑒𝑡 𝛽2,ℎ = 𝑃2. 𝐶2ℎ𝑃1. 𝐶1ℎ + 𝑃2. 𝐶2ℎ 
In general, the calibration of the parameter 𝛽𝑖,ℎ is given by: 𝛽𝑖,ℎ = 𝑃0𝑖 . 𝐶0𝑖ℎ∑ 𝑃0𝑗 . 𝐶0𝑗,ℎ𝑗  (29) 
 
Note that 𝑃0𝑖 and 𝐶0𝑖ℎ  simply represent the values at the initial year of household prices and 
individual consumption respectively (see Hosoe et al. 2010, page 63 for the conversion of 
quantities into monetary value)). 
Now proceed to the calibration of 𝛼𝑘,𝑖  starting from a Cobb Douglas production function with 
technological parameter 𝜇𝑗  defined by. 𝑄𝑗(𝑋𝑘1, 𝐶𝑘2, … , 𝐶𝑘𝐾) = 𝜇𝑗. ∏ 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝛼𝑘,𝑖𝑖  (30) 
Since the producer's budget constraint facing 𝐾 factors of production is indicated at an output 
level 𝑄0𝑗, he will try to solve under this constraint the following program: 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 ∑ 𝜔𝑘. 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑘  (31) 
As previously for the case of the consumer, it is easy to show that the elasticity of demand for the 
production factor 𝑘 by firm 𝑖 is defined by: 𝛼𝑘,𝑖 = 𝜔0𝑘. 𝑋0𝑘,𝑖∑ 𝜔0𝑘. 𝑋0𝑘,𝑗𝑗  (32) 
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Once 𝛼𝑘,𝑖 is known, the technological parameter 𝜇𝑗 can be determined knowing the production 𝑄0𝑗 which in principle is equal to the value  added 𝑉𝐴0𝑗  since it does not yet take into account 
the intermediary demand of the factors. So, we have:  𝑉𝐴0𝑗(𝑋0𝑘1, 𝐶0𝑘2, … , 𝐶0𝑘𝐾) = 𝜇𝑗. ∏ 𝑋0𝑘,𝑖𝛼𝑘,𝑖𝑖  
This leads to4: 𝜇𝑗 = 𝑉𝐴0𝑗∏ 𝑋0𝑘,𝑖𝛼𝑘,𝑖𝑖  (33) 
As for the coefficients of the input-output matrix 𝑎𝑖𝑗, their calibration is simply deduced from the 
relation between 𝑖𝑌𝑖𝑗 and 𝑌𝑗 where we have 𝑖𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗. 𝑌𝑗  but considering that we reason in value 
rather than in volume we obtain: 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝑖𝑌0𝑖𝑗𝑃0𝑗 . 𝑌0𝑗  (34) 
Apart from these parameters intrinsic to the model, other parameters are deduced directly from 
the SAM, namely: 𝐶0𝑖ℎ, 𝑖𝑌0𝑖𝑗 , 𝑌0𝑗 , 𝐶𝐷0𝑖 , 𝑉𝐴0𝑗 ,   𝑋0𝑘,𝑖, 𝑋𝐷0𝑘 . On the other hand, the initial 
values of the prices are defined equal to unity, that is 𝑃0𝑖 = 1; 𝜔0𝑘 = 1.  
3.5.  Closure model  
Given the objective of this work, which is to determine the threshold of the indirect tax rate on 
the labor output factor that is revenue neutral with regard to income tax rate5; we organize this 
work around two waves of scenarios. The firsts are aimed primarily at questioning the impact of 
a transfer of the government tax to households on their utility. The second wave of the scenarios 
takes up the central question of the labor tax threshold to compensate for legitimate losses by 
canceling the direct tax.  
Specifically, the first wave of scenarios all based on an indirect tax 𝜏𝑖 = 10% across all branches, 
focuses on: 
 
4
 An alternative formulation of the parameter 𝜇𝑗 is given by  𝜇𝑗 = 𝛼1𝑗−𝛼1𝑗 . 𝛼2𝑗−𝛼2𝑗 see Cardenete et al. (2017) 
5
 This objective matches with that of resolving the crises 
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• First, a simulation of the behavior of the economy variables when all the government 
transferable income 𝑇𝐶𝑇 is transferred to rich households 𝛿1 = 1; 
• The second scenario assumes an equal sharing of this government income between rich 
and poor households 𝛿1 = 0.5; 
• The third scenario is based on a full transfer of TCT to poor households 𝛿1 = 0. 
The second wave of scenarios basically holds an equal sharing i.e. 𝛿1 = 0.5 and includes three 
simulations but three other simulations are made in order to question the opportunity to tax the 
capital factor of production: 
• A 10% increase in the tax on the labor factor; 
• A tax rate of 20% on the direct tax collected on household income; 
• An adjustment of the tax rate on the labor factor compatible with the cancellation of the 
20% of the direct tax on household income; 
• A 10% increase in the tax on the capital factor; 
• A 10% tax increase on both labor and capital factors; 
• An application of the labor tax equilibrium rate rather than the capital factor. 
It should be noted that the last three scenarios are intended to justify the orientation made on the 
taxation of the labor factor. 
However, it must be recognized here that the calibration of models, especially when they become 
complex, makes it necessary to distinguish the endogenous variables from the exogenous ones. 
In this case, calibration refers to specifying and justifying the choice and the appropriateness of 
the exogenous variables according to the problem raised. For more details see Decaluwé et al. 
(2001) and Hosoe et al. (2010). 
4. Results 
The results are presented in two stages: firstly, as described above, we present in subsection 4.1 
below the results of the first scenarios dealing with the issue of distribution effects of the 
transferable government tax transferred to households. Then the rate of the tax applicable on the 
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labor factor to compensate for the renunciation of the direct taxes is exposed and supported in 
subsection 4.2. Moreover, we justify the orientation made on the labor factor in subsection 4.3. 
4.1. Tax distribution effects 
Let’s first recall that the half of the tax collected by the government represents the effective 
amount of income that has to be transferred in the circumstance of Anglophone crisis in North-
west and South-west region. The other half is transferrable to all the households in the country. It 
derives from an indirect tax on both agricultural, industrial and services productions at the rate of 
10% in each. It should also be noted that the interpretation of the results calls for precautionary 
measures as long as prices are always expressed in terms of numéraire. We have considered in 
this work as numéraire the net labor price 𝜔𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑏. This is actually an arbitrary unit of measurement 
in which all our results will be expressed. Consider the case of prices: then we must keep in mind 
that their starting values were set at 1 and therefore any variation found must be analyzed relative 
to the numeraire. We will therefore be tempted if we consider the first column of Table 1 in 
appendix to say that, the price of agricultural goods increases by 20.1% or that of industrial goods 
increases by 16.3%. We cannot validate this because we do not know how much the net price of 
labor would have changed. What we do know is that initially, a unit of agricultural good purchased 
a unit of labor and that after simulation, 1.201 units of agricultural good must now be exchanged 
for one unit of labor. Alternatively, to buy a unit of labor, we will need 1/1.201 that is about 
0.8326 units of agricultural good. In other words, the labor becomes more expensive compared 
to the agricultural good. 
This precision leads to the observation that they are increasing when the transfer is made from 
rich households to poor households. We go for example from 1.201 for 𝛿1 = 1 to 1.207 for 𝛿1 =0 in the agricultural sector. This shows that the policy of taxation and transfer6 is not neutral to 
the evolution of the prices of goods. Concretely, this result reveals that it will be necessary to 
make a little more effort to acquire a unit of each good relative to the acquisition of a unit of labor 
by the firms, and more again in the case of a transfer to poor households. 
 
6
 It must of course be kept in mind that the tax transferred is first of all derived from an indirect tax rate  
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On the other hand, when we analyze the results linked to the price of the capital factor also 
expressed in index, we can see that it becomes cheaper to acquire with respect to the agricultural 
sector and expensive for industrial and services sectors compared to a unit labor factor. However, 
we must avoid thinking about a substitution of capital for labor in the case of agricultural good. 
The ingenuity here is to understand that less capital has been used in each sector of activity except 
the industrial sector (see appendix SAM). This weakness in the demand for capital has therefore 
caused the price of this factor to fall. And even beyond that, if there had been a substitution effect 
of capital for labor, this effect would be rather marginal regarding the output effect which is 
clearly materialized by the increase in production relative to labor. The latter brings some relevant 
information.  
Indeed, when the entire transfer is made to rich households, agricultural production7 and industrial 
production fall relative to labor. Their index values are indeed 0.941 and 0.994, a fall of 5.9% and 
0.6% respectively. On the other hand, the service sector is expanding, with production increasing 
by 2.8%. On the other side, where all the transfer is done for poor households, the effect is totally 
reversed. In this case, only the services sector is experiencing a fall in production relative to labor, 
while agricultural and industrial productions are in a better state. They increase by 3.8% and 1.3% 
respectively. In the case of equal sharing of the transfer, the industrial and services sectors benefit 
while agricultural production is declining. These results also show that the policy of transfer to 
the households is not neutral compared to the production of the branches. On top of that it gives 
relevant remarks.  
Indeed, if the government wishes to boost production through this transfer mechanism, she must 
be known that the results will not be positive for all sectors at the same time. At most two of the 
three sectors will benefit: 
• If he wishes to encourage the development of the agricultural and industrial sectors, she 
will have to transfer the income to poor households; 
• If he aims to boost the industrial and service sectors, she will have to share equally the 
amount of transferable income between the two groups of households; 
 
7
 A distinction is made here between gross output and net output which takes into account the intermediary production of branches and it is always 
preferable to pay attention to the net values of production 
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• But if he transfers all this income to rich households, she will have to know that only the 
services sector will benefit. 
Let’s now focus on the factors allocation in different sectors. The first observation that emerges 
is that the index values of factors are decreasing in the agricultural and industrial sectors relative 
to the labor when transfers go to rich households. There are increasing only in the services sector. 
When poor receive all the transfer, the situation is reverse while agricultural and industrial sector 
perceive differently the impact. These results corroborate what we have mentioned above on the 
price of capital. It is understandable that the decline in the value of the capital factor in agricultural 
sector makes it more abundant. In contrary, the growing of industrial and services sectors explain 
the other results. Let's end this section with the effects on well-being. 
No result on the utility of the household receiving the transfer is surprising even if it is a little 
mixed for the rich. In the case of a transfer to the poor, their utility increases by 19.986 % while 
that of the rich decreases by 14.512%. When this income is shared equally, it reduces the welfare 
of the poor to 1.665% while the decline in the welfare of the rich improves. The latter becomes 
positive and reaches 11.081% when the rich receives all the transfer while the poor sees his 
welfare deteriorate in this case. This loss of 15.312% is almost equivalent to the loss recorded by 
the rich when they receive nothing. Given this result and the security tensions that prevail in the 
Anglophone regions, a policy oriented towards a transfer to the poor or equal transfer could help 
to dilute or to allay the social tensions that swarm all over the national territory.  
4.2. Equivalent rate of the labor tax 
The question for the equivalent labor factor rate to reduce the losses from the abandoning of 
consumer income taxation assumes that the government's transfer to households is done on an 
equal basis. Let’s note from the onset a major piece of information: we note that the three 
scenarios in Table 2 in appendix contribute to improving the well-being of poor households 
against the rich. Indeed, the collection of 10% of the tax on the use of labor factor by the firms 
improves the utility of the poor by 3.18% and deteriorates that of the rich by 2.325%. These 
proportions increase to 5.478% and 3.99% respectively when the government collects a 20% tax 
on the income of each household group. At this point, an explanation may be due to the fact that 
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the equal transfer of government income to households is only profitable to poor households as 
we have shown above (see Table 1 in appendix). As a result, the higher the income transferred, 
the better the situation of the poor and the deterioration of the rich. This situation is comparable 
to the Pareto optimum. 
As for the rate applicable to the labor factor to compensate for the losses due to a waiver of the 
direct taxation of 20%, we obtained a rate of 34.569%. Indeed, with a rate of 20% on the income 
of the consumers, the government collects a transferable global income of CFAF 2429.149 billion 
against a substantially equal amount of CFAF 2429.147 billion for a rate of 34.569% on the use 
of labor factor. What can we learn from this rate? Two major pieces of information can flow from 
this result:   
• First, the search for such a compensation rate is not neutral on microeconomic variables 
Indeed, by applying this rate, we first notice that the prices of goods increase relative to the price 
of capital. The price of agricultural products increases from 1.205 to 1.621 henceforth that 
agricultural goods become less and less expensive compared to the acquisition price of a unit of 
capital. On the other hand, the nominal price of the labor factor is affected since its net price has 
been taken as numéraire. This shows that a low tax does not affect the nominal value of the labor 
while the latter reacts upward when the rate of tax becomes important. The same goes for capital 
that becomes cheaper to acquire in relation to labor. Its price index goes from 1.006 to 1.353. 
• Secondly, there is no neutrality on macroeconomic variables 
The case of the GDP is as far as concerned here. In fact, an income tax has a negative effect on 
growth with an index of 0.801, while substituting a labor rate of 34.569% leads to an increase in 
growth rate of 7.8%. 
In summary, the rate of 34.569% serves to two things:  
• First, it allows the amount of the direct tax lost by the government to be recovered as 
originally intended; 
• Secondly, it ensures economic growth. This growth largely depends on the remuneration 
of the factors that contribute to the value added of the branches. 
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So, a question at this level deserves to be asked: is there an equitable distribution of transferable 
income that would at the same time improve the situation of the rich and the poor? In trying to 
answer this question, we readjust the value of 𝛿1, which is the fraction of income allocated to rich 
households. The fact is that, the two groups of households cannot see their well-being improve at 
the same time. So, another additional question is: in this case, what is the rate applicable to 𝛿1 
that neutralizes the utility of the two household groups? The answer to this last question is that a 
56.45% income transfer to the rich versus 43.55% for the poor renders the usefulness of the two 
household groups almost null. That of rich households is -0.005% against -0.020% for the poor. 
4.3. What about the case where the tax on capital is concerned? 
Could we have had the same results with a targeted policy around the tax on capital? Or could it 
have been better to go further? These two questions justify the extension that we make in this 
point. 
The answer to these questions is provided by the results in Table 3 in appendix, which shows that, 
a policy based on capital factor taxation is ineffective in either recovering direct tax losses or 
boosting growth. First, the amount of the tax resulting from a tax rate of 34.569% for the capital 
factor is only CFAF 1337.997 billion contrary to the tax on labor. A fairly simple reason is that 
households are poorly endowed with capital as we indicated above (see SAM). Besides, growth 
is reduced by 6.5% while there was a rise of 7.8% with the tax on labor.  
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was to develop a policy of indirect taxation on output factors which 
makes it possible to reconcile the losses in case of a waiver of the direct tax. This initiative may 
help in the resolution of the security crisis in North-west and South-west regions in Cameroon. A 
static computable general equilibrium model has enabled us to determine the equivalent rate 
applicable to the labor factor that would make it possible to compensate for losses if the 
government shifts away from taxation of household income. This rate is 34.569% for an income 
tax rate of 20%. It also allows boosting growth with an impact on GDP of 7.8%. Apart from this 
rate, the total revenue that could be allocated to the victims of the Anglophone crisis is CFAF 
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2429.149 billion. Besides, half of the government income from an indirect tax of 10% on the 
outputs is transferred completely to the households either all to the rich, or all to the poor, or an 
equal sharing between the two groups. And according to the adopted policy, the household that 
receives the totality of the income sees its well-being improve whereas in case of an equal sharing 
only the poor households benefit from it.  
Therefore, one can wonder if it could be quite easy to implement such a policy. That is, could 
Cameroonian firms support a supplementary tax of 10% on output? This carry out an important 
issue concerning the economic partnership agreement which is applicable by Cameroon three 
years ago. Unfortunately, this agreement doesn’t favor this economy. Indeed, the national 
commission for monitoring and evaluation of the Cameroon EPA indicated in August 2017 that, 
this agreement has engaged losses of CFAF 685 million without creating any welfare effect on 
households and these losses seem amplifying one year to another. Thus, we recommend to resign 
this agreement first in order to allow the local firms to deploy their activity effectiveness.  
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Appendix  
Table 1: Impact on micro indicators  
 𝛿1 = 1 𝛿1 = 0.5 𝛿1 = 0 
Price of commodities    𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑟 1.201 1.204 1.207 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑 1.163 1.169 1.176 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑟 1.157 1.160 1.162 
Factor Price    𝜔𝑙𝑎𝑏 1.000 1.000 1.000 𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑝 0.993 1.004 1.015 
Change in gross output 
   𝑌𝑎𝑔𝑟 0.941 0.989 1.038 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑 0.994 1.003 1.013 𝑌𝑠𝑒𝑟 1.028 1.001 0.974 
Change in net output    𝑌𝑎𝑔𝑟 0.927 0.986 1.046 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑 0.999 1.008 1.016 𝑌𝑠𝑒𝑟 1.065 1.004 0.943 
Utility variation (%)    ∆𝑈𝑟𝑖𝑐ℎ 11.081 -1.655 -14.512 ∆𝑈𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟 -15.312 2.255 19.986 
Allocation factor (agr)    
𝐿𝑎𝑏 0.940 0.990 1.040 𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.947 0.998 1.024 
Allocation factor (ind)    𝐿𝑎𝑏 0.990 1.006 1.022 𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.997 1.002 1.007 
Allocation factor (ser)    𝐿𝑎𝑏 1.027 1.002 0.976 𝐶𝑎𝑝 1.035 0.998 0.961 
Total tax receipt    𝑇𝐶𝑇 897.442 904.912 912.510 
GDP variation    𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.998 1.001 1.004 
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𝜏𝑖 = 10% in all the activity sectors  
 
Table 2: Result for labour factor controlling 
 𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑏 = 10% 𝑚𝑖ℎ = 20% 𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑏 = 34.569% 
Price of commodities    𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑟 1.324 1.205 1.621 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑 1.286 1.170 1.574 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑟 1.276 1.160 1.561 
Factor Price    𝜔𝑙𝑎𝑏 1.100 1.000 1.346 𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑝 1.105 1.006 1.353 
Change in gross output 
   𝑌𝑎𝑔𝑟 0.992 0.998 0.996 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑 1.004 1.005 1.005 𝑌𝑠𝑒𝑟 1.000 0.996 0.997 
Change in net output    𝑌𝑎𝑔𝑟 0.989 0.997 0.995 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑 1.008 1.009 1.005 𝑌𝑠𝑒𝑟 1.001 0.993 0.997 
Utility variation (%)    ∆𝑈𝑟𝑖𝑐ℎ -2.325 -3.991 -3.549 ∆𝑈𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟 3.180 5.478 4.867 
Allocation factor (agr)    𝐿𝑎𝑏 0.992 0.999 0.997 𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.988 0.993 0.991 
Allocation factor (ind)    𝐿𝑎𝑏 1.007 1.009 1.008 𝐶𝑎𝑝 1.002 1.003 1.002 
Allocation factor (ser)    𝐿𝑎𝑏 1.000 0.997 0.998 𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.996 0.991 0.992 
Total tax receipt    𝑇𝐶𝑇 1345.837 2429.149 2429.147 
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GDP variation    𝐺𝐷𝑃 1.027 0.801 1.078 𝜏𝑖 = 10% in all the activity sectors and 𝛿1 = 0.5 
Table 3: Impact for capital factor controlling  
 𝑡𝑘 = 10% 𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝 = 10% 𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝 = 34.569% 
Price of commodities    𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑟 1.325 1.204 1.204 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑 1.286 1.169 1.170 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑟 1.276 1.160 1.160 
Factor Price    𝜔𝑙𝑎𝑏 1.100 1.000 1.000 𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑝 1.105 1.004 1.005 
Change in gross output 
   𝑌𝑎𝑔𝑟 0.993 0.991 0.993 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑 1.004 1.004 1.004 𝑌𝑠𝑒𝑟 0.999 1.000 0.999 
Change in net output    𝑌𝑎𝑔𝑟 0.991 0.988 0.991 𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑑 1.008 1.008 1.008 𝑌𝑠𝑒𝑟 0.999 1.002 0.999 
Utility variation (%)    ∆𝑈𝑟𝑖𝑐ℎ -2.717 -2.046 -2.761 ∆𝑈𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟 3.720 2.795 3.782 
Allocation factor (agr)    𝐿𝑎𝑏 0.994 0.991 0.994 𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.989 0.987 0.989 
Allocation factor (ind)    𝐿𝑎𝑏 1.007 1.006 1.007 𝐶𝑎𝑝 1.002 1.002 1.002 
Allocation factor (ser)    𝐿𝑎𝑏 1.000 1.001 0.999 𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.995 0.997 0.994 
Total tax receipt    𝑇𝐶𝑇 1514.420 1058.080 1337.997 
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GDP variation    𝐺𝐷𝑃 1.001 0.977 0.935 𝜏𝑖 = 10% in all the activity sectors and 𝛿1 = 0.5  
 
Table 4: Social Accounting Matrix (SAM for Cameroon 2016) 
AGR IND SER LAB CAP RICH POOR TOT
AGR 171,6986 425,4018 246,2275 1208,9920 1927,6801 3980,0000
IND 981,3960 852,6727 956,5011 2008,1634 1651,2668 6450,0000
SER 1091,2840 1023,9110 880,9074 2782,8445 771,0531 6550,0000
LAB 1516,2997 1587,5483 3896,1521 7000,0000
CAP 219,3218 2560,4663 570,2119 3350,0000
RICH 4021,7148 1978,2852 6000,0000
POOR 2978,2852 1371,7148 4350,0000
TOT 3980,0000 6450,0000 6550,0000 7000,0000 3350,0000 6000,0000 4350,0000
 
  
GAMS CODE OF THE MODEL 
When importing data make sure that the excel file is in the same directory with gams file. You will just need to follow 
File-View in explorer and you paste the Excel file. you should download the demo version of GAMS at 
(http://www.gams. com) 
 
$title Cameroon tax general equilibrium model: 
option decimals=3; 
option nlp=conopt; 
 
set m sam accounts / agr, ind, ser, lab, cap, rich, poor, tot/ 
 
    i(m) goods /agr, ind, ser/ 
 
    k(m) factors /lab, cap/ 
 
    h(m) households /rich, poor/ 
 
  alias (i,j) 
  alias(k,l) 
  alias(m,n); 
 
  parameters 
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  sam(m,n)              social accounting matrix entries 
  e(h,k)                    endowment 
  beta(i,h)                cd utility coefficients 
  a(i,j)                      input-output coefficients 
  alpha(k,i)              production function coefficients 
  v(i)                       value-added coefficients 
  va0(i)                   value added 
  p0(i)                     prices for goods 
  wn0(k)                  net prices for factors 
  w0(k)                   prices for factors 
  y0(i)                     total output 
  pva0(i)                 price of value-added 
  b0(k,i)                  flexible factor coefficients 
  c0(i,h)                  individual demand for final consumption 
  cd0(i)                   aggregate demand for final consumption 
  x0(k,i)                  firms factor demand 
  xd0(k)                  aggregate factor demand 
  iy0(i,j)                  intermediate consumption of good i by firm j 
  mu(i)                    technological parameter of value added 
  gdp0                     baseline gdp; 
 
  parameter 
  tau(i)                    output tax rates 
  mi(h)                    income tax 
  t(k)                      factor tax 
  theta                     fraction of government income transferred to consumers 
  del(h)                   lump sum shares; 
 
  tau(i)=0; 
  mi(h)=0; 
  t(k) = 0; 
  del(h)=0; 
 
*============importation of data from social accounting matrix======= 
 
$call gdxxrw.exe i=proj.xlsx o=pour.gdx par=sam rng=feuil1!a1:i9 rdim=1 cdim=1 
$gdxin pour.gdx 
$load sam 
$gdxin 
 
*========initialization and calibration of parameters================ 
  p0(i)        = 1; 
  w0(k)      = 1; 
  wn0(k)       = 1; 
  y0(i)        = sam('tot',i); 
  pva0(i)     = 1; 
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  c0(i,h)      = sam(i,h); 
  cd0(i)      = sum(h, c0(i,h)); 
  x0(k,i)     = sam(k,i); 
  xd0(k)       = sum(i,x0(k,i)); 
  iy0(i,j)      = sam(i,j); 
  e(h,k)      = sam(h,k) ; 
  beta(i,h)    = p0(i)*c0(i,h)/sum(j,p0(j)*c0(j,h)); 
  a(i,j)        = iy0(i,j)/y0(j); 
  alpha(k,i)   = w0(k)*x0(k,i)/(sum(l,w0(l)*x0(l,i))); 
  va0(i)      = sum(k,x0(k,i)); 
  v(i)      = va0(i)/y0(i); 
  b0(k,i)     = x0(k,i)/(v(i)*y0(i)); 
  theta        = 0.5; 
  mu(i)       = va0(i)/prod(k, x0(k,i)**alpha(k,i)); 
  gdp0        =  sum(i,va0(i)) ; 
 
  display p0,sam,w0,y0,pva0,va0,gdp0,c0,cd0,x0,xd0,iy0,b0,e,beta,a,alpha,v,mu; 
 
*=====================definition of variables===================== 
  variable 
  p(i)                      prices for goods 
  w(k)                    prices for factors 
  wn(k)                  net prices for factors 
  y(i)                      total output 
  pva(i)                  price of value-added 
  b(k,i)                   flexible factor coefficients 
  c(i,h)                   individual demand for final consumption 
  cd(i)                    aggregate demand for final consumption 
  x(k,i)                   firms factor demand 
  xd(k)                   aggregate factor demand 
  tc                         total tax collections 
  ot                         output tax collections 
  ft                         factor tax collections 
  mt                       income tax collections 
  iy(i,j)                  intermediate consumption of good i by firm j 
  va(i)                   value added for firm i 
  gdp                     gdp-income calculation 
  z                         maximizing dummy 
  tct                       total transferable tax ; 
 
*=====================declaration of equations=================== 
  equation 
  vaprice(i)            price index for value added 
  prices(i)              price formation 
  facprices(k)        net and gross factor prices 
  demand(i)           total demand for goods 
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  housdem(i,h)      households demand for goods 
  lab(i)                  variable coefficient for labour 
  cap(i)                 variable coefficient for capital 
  zdfac(k,i)           firms demand for factors 
  zfacdem(k)        total demand for factors 
  governm            government budget constraint 
  incometax          income tax collections 
  factortax            factor tax collections 
  outputtax           output tax collections 
  eqgoods(i)         equilibrium for goods 
  eqfactors(k)       equilibrium for factors 
  inter(i,j)             intermediate consumption of good i by firm j 
  eqva(i)               value added for firm i 
  eqgdp                 gdp-income calculation 
  eqtax                  share tax equation 
  maximand          aux objective function; 
 
*===================definition of equations====================== 
 
  vaprice(i)..           pva(i) =e= prod(k, w(k)**alpha(k,i)); 
  prices(i)..             p(i) =e= (1+tau(i))*(pva(i)*v(i)+sum(j,p(j)*a(j,i))); 
  facprices(k)..       w(k) =e= wn(k)*(1+t(k)) ; 
  demand(i)..          cd(i) =e= sum(h, c(i,h)); 
  housdem(i,h)..  c(i,h)=e=(1-mi(h))*beta(i,h)*(del(h)*tc+sum(k, wn(k)*e(h,k)))/p(i); 
  lab(i)..                  b('lab',i) =e= alpha('lab',i)*(w('cap')/w('lab'))**alpha('cap',i) ; 
  cap(i)..                 b('cap',i) =e= alpha('cap',i)*(w('lab')/w('cap'))**alpha('lab',i) ; 
  zdfac(k,i)..           x(k,i) =e= b(k,i)*v(i)*y(i); 
  zfacdem(k)..        xd(k) =e= sum(i, x(k,i)); 
  governm..            tc =e= ot + ft+ mt ; 
  incometax..          mt =e= sum(h, mi(h)*(del(h)*tc+sum(k, wn(k)*e(h,k))) ); 
  factortax..            ft =e= sum( (i,k), t(k)*wn(k)*b(k,i)*v(i)*y(i) ); 
  outputtax..            ot =e= sum(i, tau(i)*p(i)*y(i)/(1+tau(i))); 
  eqtax..                  tct =e= tc*theta ; 
  eqgoods(i)..         y(i)=e= cd(i) + sum(j, a(i,j)*y(j)); 
  eqfactors(k)..       xd(k)=e= sum(h, e(h,k)); 
  inter(i,j)..             iy(i,j) =e= a(i,j)*p(j)*y(j); 
  eqva(i)..               va(i) =e= sum(k, x(k,i)); 
  eqgdp..                gdp  =e=  sum(i,va(i)) + tc-mt; 
  maximand..           z =e= 1; 
 
 
*========================model declaration==================== 
  model taxcam /all/; 
 
*=====================fixing lower bounds on variables============ 
  scalar lb lower bound /1e-4/; 
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  p.lo(i)=lb; y.lo(i)=lb; w.lo(k)=lb; pva.lo(i)=lb; c.lo(i,h)=lb; 
  b.lo(k,i)=lb; x.lo(k,i)=lb; iy.lo(i,j)=lb; 
 
*====================numeraire: net price factor================== 
  wn.fx('lab') = 1;     z.fx = 1 ; 
 
*===================initialisation of variables==================== 
  p.l(i)=p0(i); y.l(i)=y0(i);  w.l(k)=w0(k);  pva.l(i)=pva0(i);  c.l(i,h)=c0(i,h); 
  b.l(k,i)=b0(k,i);  x.l(k,i)=x0(k,i);  va.l(i)=va0(i);  iy.l(i,j)=iy0(i,j); 
    wn.l('cap') = wn0('cap');  cd.l(i) = cd0(i) ;   tc.l =0; xd.l(k) = xd0(k); 
   gdp.l =gdp0;   ft.l =0; ot.l= 0; tct.l = 0; mt.l = 0; 
 
 
* taxcam.iterlim=0; 
 
  solve taxcam maximizing z using nlp ; 
 
  option limrow = 0, limcol = 0, solprint = off, solvelink = %solvelink.loadlibrary%; 
 
*==================save benchmark results====================== 
  parameter 
  y0(i)              benchmark gross output of i 
  ny0(i)           benchmark net output of i 
  pc0(i)           benchmark consumption of i 
  u0(h)           benchmark utility of h; 
 
  y0(i)        = y.l(i); 
  ny0(i)     = y.l(i)-sum(j, a(i,j)*y.l(j)); 
  pc0(i)      = sum(h, c.l(i,h)); 
  u0(h)       = prod(i, c.l(i,h)**beta(i,h)); 
 
*==========for different scenarios both for first and second result====s==== 
  tau(i)  = 0.1; 
 
*  t('lab')  = 0.1; 
*  t('lab')  = 0.34569; 
*  mi(h)  = 0.20; 
*  t(k)  = 0.10; 
*  t('cap') = 0.10; 
  t('cap')   = 0.34569; 
 
*=========choose redistribution parameter========================== 
  del('rich') = 0.5     ; del('poor') =1-del('rich'); 
*  del('rich') = 0.56444 ;    del('poor') =1-del('rich'); 
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*================solve model under policy======================== 
  solve taxcam maximizing z using nlp ; 
 
  parameter 
  u(h)               utility of h's household 
  du(h)             utility changes 
  wag               wages 
  kap                capital income 
  pc(i)               consumption of good i 
  prc                 private consumption 
  gdpi               gdp-income 
  gdpe               gdp-expenditure 
  ny(i)               net output 
  dny(i)             change or index for net output of i 
  dy(i)               change or index for gross output of i 
  igdpi               gdp income 
  igdpe              gdp expenditure 
  ip(i)                price index 
  ic(i,h)             consumption index 
  ix(k,i)             index for factor allocation 
  gdpi0              benchmark gdp 
  ; 
 
  u(h)         = prod(i, c.l(i,h)**beta(i,h)); 
  du(h)       = (u(h)/u0(h)-1)*100; 
  wag         = wn.l('lab')*xd.l('lab'); 
  kap          = wn.l('cap')*xd.l('cap'); 
  pc(i)        = sum(h, c.l(i,h)); 
  prc           = sum(i, p.l(i)*pc(i)); 
  gdpi         = wag+kap+tc.l; 
  gdpe        = prc; 
  ny(i)        = y.l(i)-sum(j, a(i,j)*y.l(j)); 
  ix(k,i)      = x.l(k,i)/x0(k,i) ; 
* output indexation: 
  dny(i)      = ny(i)/ny0(i) ; 
  dy(i)        = y.l(i)/y0(i); 
  gdpi0       = sum(i,va0(i))+  tc.l; 
  igdpi        = (sum(i,va0(i))+  tc.l)/gdpi0  ; 
  ip(i)         = p.l(i)/p0(i); 
  ic(i,h)       = c.l(i,h)/c0(i,h); 
  igdpe       = prc/gdpi0 ; 
 
  display del, tau,e,igdpi,ip,ic,t,pva.l,du,c.l,pc,prc,iy.l, m, 
  p.l, w.l,wn.l,cd.l,ix, b.l,dy, dny,ft.l,ot.l, x.l, y.l, 
  gdpi, gdpi0, igdpe,wag, kap, tc.l,tct.l, gdpe; 
*===========================END============================ 
